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The Eurozone crisis has altered the party political landscape across Europe. The most visible 
effect is the rise of challenger parties. The crisis not only caused economic hardship, but also 
placed considerable fiscal constraints upon a number of national governments. Many voters 
have reacted to this by turning their back on the traditional parties and opting instead for 
new, or reinvigorated, challenger parties that reject the mainstream consensus of austerity 
and European integration. This article argues that both sanctioning and selection 
mechanisms can help to explain this flight from the centre to challenger parties. First, voters 
who were economically adversely affected by the crisis punish mainstream parties both in 
government and in opposition by voting for challenger parties. Second, the choice of specific 
challenger party is shaped by preferences on three issues that directly flow from the Euro 
crisis: EU integration, austerity and immigration. Analysing both aggregate-level and 
individual-level survey data from all 17 Western EU member states, this article finds strong 
support for both propositions and shows how the crisis has reshaped the nature of party 
competition in Europe.  
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‘There is No Alternative’ was the recurring refrain from many national governments 
during the Eurozone crisis, referring to the necessity of austerity and structural reforms. The 
consequences of the sovereign debt crisis that followed the global financial crisis of 2008 
have been felt acutely in many European countries. Yet, in most of Europe, the policy 
response by the mainstream, on both the left and right, focused on tackling debt rather than 
reducing unemployment. The external constraints on national governments’ room to 
manoeuvre also became more obvious, especially in the countries facing a sovereign debt 
crisis. Governments of debtor states were asked to impose severe spending cuts and structural 
reforms in return for bail-outs from the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  The emergency politics of the crisis dramatically limited the political choices 
available to citizens (Scharpf 2011; Cramme and Hobolt 2014; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; 
Laffan 2014). 
Voters have reacted by rejecting the traditional parties and turning instead to 
challenger parties. Challenger parties seek to challenge the mainstream political consensus 
and do not ordinarily enter government. These parties are unconstrained by the 
responsibilities of government and tend to compete on extreme or “niche” issue positions 
(Adams, Clark, Ezrow et al. 2006; van der Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt 2014). There are 
multiple examples of the success of challengers in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. These 
include the emergence of new successful challenger parties, such as the Alternative for 
Germany, the Five Star Movement (Italy) and Podemos (Spain), the surge in support for the 
established radical right parties across Northern Europe, and notably the election of a radical 
leftwing Syriza-led government in Greece in 2015.  
Why did certain voters defect from mainstream political parties and opt for challenger 
parties in the aftermath of the crisis? We offer two explanations. The first is rooted in the 
classic theory of retrospective voting, where voters punish incumbents for poor economic 
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performance. The expectation is that voters will “throw out the rascals” in government when 
the economy performs poorly. However, given the perception that mainstream parties, 
whether currently in government or not, were responsible for the economic woes, we expect 
the sanctioning to extend beyond government parties to all mainstream parties, including 
those currently in opposition. We thus hypothesize that voters negatively affected by the 
crisis, e.g. through job loss or reduced earnings, will punish mainstream parties and turn to 
challenger parties instead. 
This retrospective model of economic voting helps to explain the electoral 
punishment of governing parties during the crisis, but it cannot be the full story. Our second 
explanation thus focuses on the specific appeal of different challenger parties. Our argument 
is that defectors choose challenger parties because they offer a rejection of, and an alternative 
to, the mainstream response to the crisis. Whereas the mainstream left and right have 
converged on a policy of austerity and an adherence to the fiscal policy-making guidelines of 
the EU, successful challenger parties have sought to offer clear alternatives. On the left, 
challenger parties reject the austerity agenda and are critical of the EU’s insistence of reduced 
government welfare spending. On the right, the focus is on the desire to reclaim national 
sovereignty, specifically to control immigration and repatriate powers from the EU. In both 
cases, challenger parties reject the “there is no alternative” argument and instead claim that 
national governments can control their own destiny and offer distinct policies. 
To test these propositions we examine who defected from mainstream West European 
parties after the onset of the crisis. First, we track the changes in the success of challenger 
parties since the beginning of the crisis and show that there has been a sharp increase in 
support across Western Europe after 2010. Then we use the 2014 European Election Study to 
show that retrospective economic voting matters to people’s decision to defect from the 
mainstream to challenger parties: people who were personally adversely affected by the crisis 
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are more likely to defect. Crucially, we demonstrate that voters not only punish parties in 
government, but also mainstream opposition parties. Defection is most likely when 
individuals are disconnected from mainstream party policy, not least regarding three issues 
that are closely tied to the EU and the Euro crisis: EU integration, austerity measures and 
immigration. We conclude by discussing whether the rise of challenger parties is likely to be 
a temporary blip due to the crisis or a more permanent feature of West European politics. 
  
Fleeing the centre 
The financial crisis that erupted in late 2008 vividly demonstrated both the 
interconnectedness of financial markets and the increasingly limited power of national 
governments. As the financial turmoil travelled from the US to Europe, it evolved into a 
sovereign debt crisis. By 2012, eight out of 28 EU member states had received some form of 
financial bailout (Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain). In 
return for these credit arrangements by the EU, jointly with the IMF, the debtor countries had 
to engage in significant fiscal retrenchment and structural reforms, mainly to social welfare 
programmes. The economic and social consequences of the crisis within the EU have been 
far-reaching with high levels of unemployment and low levels of growth. This situation was 
worst in debtor countries in Southern Europe, notably in Greece, Spain and Portugal, where a 
quarter of the workforce were unable to find a job in 2014,
1
 whereas other countries such as 
Germany enjoyed a considerable current account surplus and relatively low levels 
unemployment. The contrast with the reluctantly provided rescue credit to debtor states under 
rigid ‘conditionalities’ formulated by the EU/IMF/ECB ‘Troika’ is stark (Scharpf 2014). 
Looming over these unpopular decisions by certain national governments were the 
constraints that European integration has imposed. Even in areas at the very heart of state 
                                                          
1
  Source: Eurostat (seasonally adjusted figures from May 2014). 
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power, namely fiscal policy-making, national governments looked impotent (Laffan 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, there has been a political backlash. The most notable sign of this reaction has 
been the rise of challenger parties that reject the mainstream consensus. Challenger parties 
highlight issues such as European integration and immigration that have often been 
downplayed by the mainstream, and foster new linkages with voters who feel left behind by 
established parties (Meguid 2008; Wagner 2012; van der Wardt et al. 2014).  
A variety of terms have been used to describe such parties that challenge the 
mainstream, including “niche parties” (Meguid 2008; Adams et al. 2006; Jensen and Spoon 
2010), “challenger parties” (Hino 2012; van der Wardt et al. 2014), “populist parties” (Mudde 
2007; Pauwel 2012; Kriesi 2014) and “new politics parties” (Poguntke 1987). Regardless of 
nomenclature, all these authors focus on parties that defy existing patterns of party 
competition by rejecting the traditional economic dimension of politics and mobilizing on 
new issues or adopting more extreme positions on existing issues. In the case of populist 
parties, this also involves a more wholesale rejection of the existing “corrupt” elite and the 
claim that they alone are the true voice of the people (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2007; Kriesi 
2014).  
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus on how to define or measure such parties in 
the literature. As an example, niche parties have become one of the most used labels in the 
literature (see e.g. Meguid 2005, 2006; Adams et al. 2006; Jensen and Spoon 2010; Wagner 
2012), yet there is no agreement on the actual distinction between niche and mainstream. 
Some studies define niche parties as those that reject the traditional class-based orientation of 
politics, raise novel issues (Meguid 2005, 2008), and “compete primarily on a smaller 
number of non-economic issues” (Wagner 2011). Others propose a more inclusive definition 
where niche parties represent “either an extreme ideology (such as Communist and extreme 
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nationalist parties) or noncentrist “niche” ideology (i.e. the Greens)” (Adams et al. 2006: 
513). 
This paper also seeks to identify parties that challenge the mainstream party political 
consensus, but we adopt a novel approach to the measurement that focuses on participation in 
government. We argue that measuring whether or not parties ordinarily participate in 
government has the advantage that it indirectly captures many of the features of niche and 
populist parties (the mobilization of new issues and/or extreme positions on existing issues as 
well as the rejection of the political establishment), yet with greater parsimony and simplicity 
than measuring what qualifies as “niche”, “populist” or “extreme”. Moreover, it highlights an 
important aspect of challenger parties that is not captured by existing classifications, namely 
the degree to which a party has government responsibility for political outcomes for which 
they can be held to account.  
Hence, in our classification, mainstream parties are those parties that frequently 
alternate between government and opposition. Their policy platforms are likely to be affected 
by both their past experience in office and their desire to enter office again. In the eyes of 
voters, such parties find it difficult to escape responsibility for prolonged crises, such as the 
Eurozone crisis. By their very nature, mainstream parties, in opposition and in office, are also 
more cautious in mobilizing around new issues or adopting positions far from other parties, 
since both would make it more difficult to enter into coalition government (Tavits 2008; van 
der Wardt et al. 2014; Hobolt and de Vries 2015).  By contrast, challenger parties are 
untarnished by office. While these parties are not necessarily new, they have not formed part 
of government. Rather they have instead sought to reshape the political landscape by putting 
new issues on the agenda (De Vries and Hobolt 2012).
2
 Successful challenger parties include 
                                                          
2
 Most of these challenger parties are also “niche parties” (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2008) and/or “populist 
parties” (Mudde 2007). However, in this article we focus specifically on government experience as the 
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Front National in France, Podemos in Spain, and the Five Star Movement in Italy. Such 
parties have changed the nature of party competition and restructured the political agenda, in 
most cases without ever setting foot in government. Indeed their appeal is partially based on 
the fact that they are not tainted by holding office when the seeds of the crisis were sown. 
Just as importantly, their lack of government experience and limited incentive, and 
opportunity, to join future government coalitions enables them to adopt more risky political 
platforms. This allows challenger parties to offer a clear alternative narrative to the 
mainstream consensus. Challenger parties on the left reject the notion that austerity politics is 
a necessary evil. On the right, challenger parties argue that powers should be repatriated from 
the EU to national government and parliaments, and that they can stem the threat of 
globalization (especially foreign immigrant labour).  
In this paper we examine the causes of the rise of these challenger parties, focusing on 
the individual-level motivations of voters. Since the very notion of challenger parties assumes 
that there is an established party system to defy, our empirical focus is on Western European 
members of the EU that have established party systems.
3
 To illustrate the change that has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinguishing factor, since this affects whether such parties can be held to account by voters and also their 
ability to challenge the mainstream policy consensus (van der Wardt et al. 2014). To check the robustness of our 
party classification in comparison to other measures, we have replicated all of our analyses using the standard 
Adams et al. (2006) operationalization of niche parties based on the Comparative Manifesto Project 
classification of parties into party families. Parties belonging to the Green/Ecological [10], Communist/ Socialist 
[20], and Nationalist [70] party families as well as Special Issue parties [95] with non-centrist niche ideologies 
are classified as niche parties.  All our main findings hold using this alternative operationalization (see Tables 
A2 and A3 in the Appendix). Table A4 in the Appendix lists all parties (in 2014) included in both the challenger 
and niche party categories. 
3
 Although party systems and party competition are beginning to stabilize in Central and Eastern Europe, these 
political systems are still characterized by high volatility which makes it difficult to clearly identify mainstream 
parties (Bakke and Sitter 2005). 
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occurred since the onset of the crisis, Figure 1 plots the vote shares of mainstream and 
challenger parties across the 17 West European members of the EU between 2004 and 2015. 
We define three types of challenger party. All three types are parties that were not part of any 
national-level government in the 30 years preceding the Euro crisis (1970-2010).
4
 We also 
use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to distinguish between right-wing and left-wing  
challenger parties (Bakker et al. 2015), using the general left-right question in CHES: “Please 
tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 
(extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)”. Parties scoring more than 5 are classified as right-wing 
and parties scoring less than 5 are classified as left-wing.
5
 While challenger parties often 
mobilize issues that do not clearly coincide with the classic economic left-right dimension 
(Meguid 2008; Wagner 2012), such as issues relating to immigration, the environment and 
European integration (Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Wardt et al. 2015), most parties are 
nonetheless perceived by experts and citizens alike as belonging to either the general “left” or 
the “right” of politics.6  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
4
 Any cut-off point in terms of government experience to determine when a party is, or is not, a challenger party 
is somewhat arbitrary. However, this operationalization offers both parsimony and captures parties without any 
recent government experience. Using a slightly different operationalization that looks at post-war participation 
in government yields very similar results.  
5
 For parties scoring 5, we classify them on the basis of coalition partners or their membership of European 
Parliament political groups. Green parties are those parties whose ideology centres on the principles of green 
politics and environmentalism. The full list of challenger and mainstream parties can be found in the Appendix 
Table A4. 
6
 One exception is the Five Star Movement in Italy which is very difficult to classify. Our results are robust to 
the classification of this party in either of the three challenger party categories. 
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The left-hand figure clearly demonstrates the decline in the vote shares of mainstream 
parties. In 2004 mainstream parties on the left and right dominated West European party 
systems with 86 per cent of the total vote share. This declined by 14 percentage points to 72 
per cent in 2015. Mainstream parties on the centre-left and on the centre-right saw similar 
falls in their vote share, around 7 percentage points, over the 11 year period. In the right-hand 
figure, we observe a corresponding increase in support for challenger parties on both the left 
and the right, while green challenger parties have experienced less change. Overall challenger 
parties have increased their vote share from around 10 to 23 per cent during the period.
7
 On 
the right, these include the Finns Party in Finland, the Swedish Democrats in Sweden and the 
Danish People’s Party in Denmark, whereas on the left these include the Red-Green Alliance 
in Denmark, Syriza in Greece (although in government after the crisis) and Die Linke in 
Germany. 
Of course, different shades of challenger party politics have unsettled Europe long 
before the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, as parties like the Front National in France, the 
Northern League in Italy, or Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Netherlands successfully 
exploited popular anxieties about migration, globalization, Islam and European integration. 
Could the success of challenger parties simply be a product of the secular decline of the 
mainstream left and right parties, or what some have called the end of the “age of party 
democracy” (Mair 2013; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000)? Our aggregate data suggest not, in 
that most of the change is more recent. After all in 2004 only 10 per cent of voters supported 
challengers. Nonetheless aggregate data cannot tell us whether the rise of challenger parties is 
                                                          
7
 Less than 100 per cent of vote shares were allocated, since only parties with over 1% of the vote (or at least 
one MP) were classified. This estimate of challenger parties is therefore conservative, since most of these very 
small parties and candidates are likely to belong to the challenger party category. 
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linked to people’s experiences during the crisis. To answer this question, we need to examine 
the motivations of voters who defected from the mainstream to challenger parties over the 
last few years. 
We argue this type of defection is, at least in part, determined by the economic crisis, 
and the governmental response to the crisis. The choice to defect to a challenger party is 
about sanctioning and selection (Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Fearon 1999). If we understand 
elections as mechanisms for political accountability, then they must function as a sanctioning 
device in which voters reward or punish incumbents on the basis of past performance (Key 
1966; Fiorina 1981; Manin 1997; Powell 2000). This is the core intuition of the economic 
voting model, which suggests that voters punish governments for bad economic performance 
and reward them for good performance (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Nannestad and 
Paldam 1994). In times of crisis, we would thus expect governments to be more likely to be 
thrown out of office. Bartels’ (2013) aggregate level analysis of the “Great Recession” has 
shown that this pattern holds. Citizens punished incumbent governments for slow economic 
growth during the crisis, although it does appear that heightened perceptions of the EU’s 
economic responsibility somewhat reduced domestic economic voting in Southern Europe 
(Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012).  
Most empirical studies of economic voting use either macro-level indicators of the 
economy (e.g. unemployment and inflation) or survey data on people’s view  of economic 
change as an indicator of macro-economic performance (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
2000, 2007 for overviews). These studies have shown a strong relationship between the 
economy and incumbent performance. There are, however, reasons why we may want to 
focus on people’s direct experience with the crisis, rather than indicators of macro-economic 
change. First, country-level studies using aggregate data make it difficult to disentangle the 
individual-level motivations for defection. Second, although perceptions of the economy are 
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normally highly correlated with party choice, there is increasing concern that the direction of 
causality is actually from party support to economic evaluations (Evans and Andersen 2006; 
Evans and Pickup 2010). By focusing on personal experiences, or what is known as the 
pocketbook model of economic voting, we circumvent many of these problems. There is also 
increasing evidence that personal economic circumstances, such as declining wages, benefit 
cuts or unemployment, are important determinants of voting behaviour (Bechtel and 
Hainmueller 2011; Margalit 2011; Richter 2006). In the context of the crisis, we expect that 
people who experienced a deterioration in their personal financial situation, e.g. through job 
loss or reduced income, will be more likely to defect from mainstream parties. This leads to 
our first hypothesis: 
H1: People who were adversely economically affected by the economic crisis are more likely 
to defect from mainstream parties to challenger parties. 
 
However, the pocketbook voting model does not in and of itself explain why voters 
turn to challenger parties rather than to other mainstream parties in opposition. Voters do not 
see elections as simply sanctioning devices, but also as opportunities to choose a political 
representative with the right set of preferences and qualities (Besley, 2005; Fearon, 1999). 
This is about the prospective selection of specific parties, rather than retrospective 
sanctioning of the government. Our argument is that the convergence among mainstream 
parties during the crisis has led to defection to challenger parties from people who are 
dissatisfied with that consensus. During the crisis, the mainstream consensus was based on a 
shared acceptance of fiscal austerity deference to the discretionary authority of the EU 
(Scharpf 2014; White 2014). While challenger parties are united in the fact that they offer an 
alternative to established mainstream policies and often mobilize new issues, they differ 
significantly in their focus.  
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Radical right challenger parties tend to mobilize support along the cultural or “new 
politics” dimension, emphasizing the repatriation of powers from the EU and the introduction 
of more restrictive immigration policies, often with a distinct ethno-centric message 
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995; van der Brug et al. 2005; Rydgren 2008). While left challenger 
parties share the opposition to the political establishment and elite, they propose more 
extreme left-wing positions on the economic left-right spectrum. These typically reject the 
neoliberal character of the responses to the crisis, and are often accompanied by mobilization 
on more novel political issues such as anti-globalization, freedom of information, and direct 
democracy (see e.g. March and Mudde 2005). Some left-wing challenger parties are also 
Eurosceptic, arguing that the EU is a vehicle of global capitalism and a threat to the national 
welfare state (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Building on this 
literature, we thus expect that individuals who reject a pro-European mainstream consensus 
are more likely to defect to challenger parties on the right, while those opposed to neo-liberal 
economics and austerity are more likely to turn to challenger parties on the left. This leads to 
the following two hypotheses: 
H2a: People who are Eurosceptic and more opposed to immigration are more likely to defect 
from mainstream parties to a right wing challenger party. 
H2b: People who strongly favour more economic redistribution are more likely to defect 
from mainstream parties to a left wing challenger party. 
 
Explaining defection from the mainstream 
As Figure 1 shows challenger parties have become increasingly important 
components of party systems across Western Europe, especially in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Our analysis here focuses on the questions of why some people have defected from 
mainstream parties, of left and right, and lent their support to these various challenger parties. 
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To do this we analyse the 2014 European Election Study (EES), which is ideally suited to 
examine individual level motivations for defection as it asks identical questions of vote 
intention, vote recall, financial situation and policy preferences of representative samples of 
voters all EU member states (Schmitt et al. 2015).
8
 We focus on why certain individuals have 
switched support between parties over the electoral cycle in different countries in Western 
Europe. Specifically we look at people that previously cast a vote for a mainstream party in 
the last national election, but by 2014 supported a challenger party. Before looking at the 
reasons behind defection, it is important to note how defection from the mainstream has been 
crucial to challenger party success on both the left and right.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 shows how people in the seventeen Western European member states said 
they voted in the previous national election and how they would choose to vote in June 2014 
when they were interviewed. It is noteworthy that the pattern of change that we see here 
matches the aggregate data shown in Figure 1. Both mainstream right and left parties have 
fewer people supporting them in 2014 than they did in the previous national election. Who 
benefits from these defections? Challenger left and challenger right parties benefit roughly 
equally. Both increase their support by about half.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
8
 Approximately 1,100 respondents were interviewed in each EU member country, totalling 30,064 
respondents. Our analysis only focuses on the 17 West European member states. The EES 2014 was carried 
out by TNS Opinion between the 30
th
 May and 27
th
 June 2014. All the interviews were carried out face to 
face. More information can be found here: http://eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/, where the EES 
questionnaire can also be found. 
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Table 2 shows more clearly the flow of voters. The figures show the percentage vote 
for different types of parties as a percentage of previous party type. Loyal supporters, those 
who previously supported a particular party type and continue to do so, are shown on the 
diagonal. Roughly 8 out of 10 supporters of both mainstream right and left parties are 
loyalists. While there is some switching between left and right, overall to the benefit of the 
left, and some mobilization from previous non-voters, the overwhelming picture is of 
stability. The makeup of challenger party support is very different to mainstream party 
support. All three types of challenger party have barely half of supporters that are loyalists. 
Challenger parties pick up support from both mainstream parties and from previous non-
voters. Almost half of support for challenger parties is due to defection from the mainstream 
or mobilization from non-voting. But that does not mean that defection is that common. In 
total about 9 per cent of people who voted previously and now express a vote intention switch 
from the mainstream to the challengers (there are only 1 per cent that switch the other way). 
While that is not a huge proportion of the electorate, it is a proportion that has transformed 
challenger parties from insignificant to significant players. That raises the question of what 
makes those people switch. Why has a tenth of the electorate turned their back on mainstream 
parties? 
As discussed above there are two major drivers of electoral behaviour: sanctioning 
and selection. Our argument is that both sanctioning on the basis of economic experiences 
determines and selection on the basis of policy preferences determines whether people defect. 
Our dependent variable is thus defection. We restrict our analysis to those individuals who 
supported mainstream parties in the previous national election and we see what factors made 
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people more or less likely to defect, in terms of supporting a different party today, to 
challenger parties.
9
  
To capture sanctioning and selection, we use two sets of independent variables. 
Economic sanctioning is modelled by including a measure that captures how the crisis 
affected individuals financially. This consists of two questions. The first asks whether the 
respondent, or someone in their household, lost their job over the last two years. The second 
asks whether the respondent’s household saw a decrease in income over the last two years. 
We add up the number of adverse impacts, so people who said their income decreased and 
someone lost their job score 2, people that just mention one adverse impact score 1 and 
people that mention neither score zero. 48 per cent of people in the 17 Western European 
states score zero, 32 per cent score 1 and 20 per cent score 2. 
To capture selection based on policy preferences, we use a series of 11 point policy 
scales. These concern the redistribution of wealth, raising taxes to spend more on public 
services, restricting immigration, furthering European integration and the trade-off between 
environmental protection and economic growth.
10
 We have recoded these so that the more 
                                                          
9
 One issue is the coding of non-voters. We have excluded all people who refused to answer the previous vote 
question (9 per cent of respondents) but included ‘don’t knows’ (2 per cent of respondents) as non-voters along 
with the 23 per cent of people who stated that they did not vote previously. In terms of current party support, we 
include anyone who did not give a party name as a non-voter, including people who answered ‘don’t know’, did 
not give an answer, and people who specifically said that they would not vote. In total this includes 32 per cent 
of respondents. The only difference we make in terms of coding challenger party support is to categorise support 
of very minor parties that fail to make the 1 per cent threshold that we applied to the aggregate data. 
10
 Respondents were asked on the extent to which they agreed/ disagreed with the following statements on an 
11-point scale: ‘You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor’; ‘You are fully 
in favour of raising taxes to increase public services’; ‘You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on 
immigration’, ‘The EU should have more authority over the EU Member States’ economic and budgetary 
policies’; ‘Environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth’. 
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‘right-wing’ responses are higher numbers. This means that high scores indicate that a person 
is against redistribution, against increasing taxes, against further European integration, 
favours economic growth over environmental protection, and favour restricting immigration 
further.
11
    
We include a number of demographic variables in the models: age, occupational 
social class, religiosity, sex, education, citizenship and trade union membership.
12
 We also 
include political interest as an important control when looking at switches to non-voting, this 
is measured on a 1-4 scale from not interested to very interested. Finally, we include a series 
of dummy variables for each country (fixed-effects) to control for country effects. 
Table 3 shows the first two models that test hypothesis 1:
13
 does sanctioning happen 
and does it affect all mainstream parties? Because the sanctioning model is focused on the 
punishment of governments, we separate out those who previously voted for a mainstream 
party in government from those who previously voted for a mainstream party outside 
government. According to the classic model of economic voting, we would only expect it to 
affect governing parties. However, if voters are sanctioning the mainstream consensus then 
                                                          
11
 We have also recoded ‘don’t know’ responses to the mid points of the scale (6) in order to maximise the 
number of cases included in the models. Don’t knows make up 4-5 per cent of the responses, and including them 
in this way makes no material difference to the results.    
12
 The occupational social class categories are self-employed, managerial, professional, white-collar worker, 
skilled manual worker, unskilled manual worker, student, unemployed and out of the labour force. Education is 
based on terminal age of education and consists of three categories: education finished before 16, education 
finished before 19, education finished at 20 or over. Religiosity is measured using church attendance divided 
into four categories: weekly, monthly, yearly and never. Age is measured in years, trade union members are 
distinguished from non-members and citizens are distinguished from non-citizens.   
13
 All of the main results are robust to a different classification of challenger parties using instead the Adams et 
al. (2006) operationalization of niche parties. These results are shown in Tables A2 and A3 in the Web 
Appendix. 
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we should expect it to affect all mainstream parties. The two models presented here are thus 
multinomial logit models which compare either 1) defection from mainstream governing 
parties to challengers or non-voting or 2) defection from mainstream opposition parties to 
challengers or non-voting. We group all challenger parties together.  
Included in this model are the measures of the economic impact of the crisis on 
individuals, political interest and demographic controls mentioned earlier, although we just 
show the coefficients for economic impacts and political interest in the table. In the main, the 
effect of any of the social characteristics is small, with the exception of age. Older people are 
generally less likely to switch away from mainstream parties, no doubt because they have 
stronger partisan loyalties built up over many years (Converse 1969; Tilley 2003). 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
  
A clear story emerges from these results. People who defected from mainstream 
parties to challengers are those disproportionately affected by negative economic factors in 
their own lives. Crucially this is true whether the mainstream party they previously voted for 
is currently in government or not. People are not simply punishing governing parties, they are 
voting against mainstream parties as a whole. In fact, people in poor economic circumstances 
are actually more likely to defect to challengers from mainstream parties outside government 
than from mainstream parties within government. Hence, in line with our first hypothesis we 
find that those who experience economic hardship during the crisis are more likely to turn 
their backs on all mainstream parties. Figure 2 shows the rates of defection from mainstream 
parties in government and in opposition for people who experienced no negative economic 
effects compared to those in households that experienced both unemployment and declining 
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income. Positive numbers indicate that parties attract more voters negatively affected by the 
crisis. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The left hand figure shows how defection rates differ by economic circumstance for 
people who previously supported a governing party. There is clearly an effect of poor 
economic circumstances on defection to mainstream opposition parties, they get more 
defectors from those severely affected by the crisis. But so do challenger parties. In fact the 
effect on defection to challengers is greater. More importantly though, the right hand figure 
shows defection from mainstream opposition parties given different economic experiences. In 
contrast to classic economic voting models, we find that adverse experiences generate more 
defection to challengers from people who previously voted for mainstream opposition parties 
even though those mainstream parties are not in government. These are fairly sizable effects 
as well. The average defection rate from both mainstream governing and opposition parties to 
challengers is about 25 per cent (given the specific type of person described in the figures). 
Moving from good to poor economic experiences thus makes a substantial difference to the 
possibility of defection.  
Hence, there is evidence of economic sanctioning and support for our first hypothesis, 
but on what basis do voters decide which party to select? Table 4 shows the coefficients from 
a multinomial logit model that predicts defection from mainstream parties (both in 
government and in opposition) to the three different types of challenger party and also to non-
voting. It is first worth noting that all four types of defector are more likely to have directly 
experienced economic problems. Interestingly, the question of which specific party they 
defected to is not affected by the impact of the economic crisis; the size of the economic 
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effect is rather similar across all four types of defector. How do we explain which specific 
party these defectors turn to?  
In line with our second set of hypotheses (H2a and H2b), table 4 shows that there is 
significant variation in the ideological profile of defectors to different parties. People who left 
the mainstream to join the challenger right parties are much more anti-immigration and anti-
EU than mainstream loyalists, but they differ very little in terms of their views on the 
environment and redistribution, and are only very slightly more in favour of restricting 
government spending. Defectors to the challenger left are a little more anti-EU and a little 
more pro-environment and immigration than mainstream party loyalists, but these are not big 
differences. The big difference between loyalists and defectors to the challenger left is 
attitudes towards redistribution. Those in favour of greater redistribution are much more 
likely to defect to challenger left parties. This is also the case for challenger green parties, 
although unsurprisingly the best policy predictor is support for environmental protection. 
Finally the best predictor of people who become non-voters is not ideology, but political 
interest. While political interest appears to have little effect on defection from mainstream to 
challenger parties, it is the politically uninterested that leave mainstream parties and exit the 
system altogether.
14
          
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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 Table A1 in the Appendix shows similar models that look at mobilisation from non-voting to voting for the 
different party types. The results here echo, albeit more weakly, the same processes that we see for defection 
from mainstream parties. Moreover, as we might expect mobilised voters are more politically interested than 
those that stay non-voters, but there are no real differences in how political interest affects mobilisation to 
different types of party.  
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These effects are not trivial. Figure 3 shows how a two standard deviation move (from 
a position of one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the 
mean) on the three most important policy scales affects rates of defection. These are clearly 
substantial effects given the relative rarity of defection. Challenger right parties get 
substantially more defectors from those who are opposed to EU integration and immigration, 
in line with findings in the existing literature on the far right (see e.g. van der Brug 2005; 
Rydgren 2008), whereas challenger left parties get substantially more defectors from those in 
favour of redistribution. Mainstream parties hang on to supporters who are more in tune with 
the mainstream party consensus on EU integration, immigration and redistribution. It is 
rejection of this mainstream consensus, in any of its forms, that motivates people to leave the 
embrace of mainstream parties, but the policy area that is being rejected is a crucial predictor 
of which challenger party will benefit from that defection.    
 
Conclusion 
Challenger parties are the political success story of the aftermath of the Euro crisis. 
Both on the left and the right it is parties that have not recently been in government that have 
benefitted from the exodus of voters from mainstream parties. The decline in the vote shares 
of mainstream parties since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 is around 12 percentage 
points. With the exception of Greece, mainstream parties have remained the dominant actors 
in government in Western Europe, yet those defections have nonetheless transformed 
challenger parties from often very marginal political players to repositories of a substantial 
proportion of people’s votes. 
Why has this happened? We have argued that the classic model of elections as 
mechanisms for sanctioning and selection offers a helpful framework to understand defection 
from mainstream to challenger parties. Starting with sanctioning, defection is clearly linked 
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to the economic crisis. People who were subject to declining economic fortunes are more 
likely to desert mainstream parties, whether in government or opposition. Voters are not 
simply reacting to the perceived failures of mainstream parties however. They are also 
choosing challenger parties on the basis of policy. Challengers on the right gain voters from 
the mainstream who disagree with the mainstream consensus on immigration and EU 
integration. Challengers on the left gain voters from the mainstream who disagree with the 
consensus on fiscal policy. Thus, both sanctioning and ideological selection matter in how 
challenger parties convert mainstream party voters. 
While the majority of people remain loyal to the mainstream, the increasing 
proportion of voters that opt for challenger parties is likely to have a significant impact on 
party systems and European democracy. First, voters are often attracted to challenger parties 
because of their stances on issues such as European integration and immigration. The more 
Eurosceptic position adopted by most challenger parties has put pressure on national 
governments and made it more difficult to reach agreement on political issues, as 
demonstrated not least during the recent Mediterranean immigration crisis. Second, the 
success of challenger parties has influenced the stability of governments. Since challenger 
parties tend to stay in opposition, the formation, and maintenance, of stable coalitions has 
become more and more difficult. It has also meant the rise of ‘grand coalition’ governments 
spanning left and right mainstream parties, which has, ironically, strengthened the claims of 
challenger parties that all mainstream parties offer the same policies. 
This raises the question of whether the success of challenger parties is a fleeting 
phenomenon that will dissipate as the economy improves, or whether it is the beginning of a 
new type of party politics in Western Europe. The crisis, and the mainstream party response 
to it, has facilitated the success of challenger parties, but it is not clear that the demand for 
such parties will simply disappear as economic conditions improve. Voters are less partisan 
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than they were and more disillusioned with the established political class and this will 
continue to add to the appeal of challenger parties. Nonetheless, much will depend on how 
parties, both mainstream and challenger, respond to the changing political landscape. Some 
successful challenger parties choose to eventually enter government. If such stints in office 
are more than passing, these parties are likely to be held to account for the decisions and 
compromises taken in office, and this is likely to diminish their appeal to many of their 
current supporters. Such challenger parties may cease to be “challengers” and become part of 
the mainstream. The example of the Syriza-led government in Greece shows how 
government responsibility can force challenger parties closer to the mainstream consensus. 
Equally, much of the appeal of challenger parties during the crisis was that mainstream 
parties were perceived to offer very similar positions on important issues relating to the 
economy, Europe and immigration. Hence, the continued success of challenger parties will 
also depend on the policy choices offered by the mainstream. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1:  Vote shares of different types of parties in Western Europe, 2004-2015 
   
 
 
 
Note: These graphs show the mean vote share in national general elections holding vote share constant 
between elections. 
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Table 1:  Percentage vote for different types of parties (2014) 
 
Party type Previous vote Vote intention Change 
Mainstream right 42% 36% -6% 
Mainstream left 37% 33% -3% 
Challenger right 8% 12% +4% 
Challenger left 10% 14% +3% 
Challenger green 4% 5% +1% 
All  
(N) 
100% 
11,424 
100% 
11,614 
 
 
Note:  Non-voters and people that said don’t know or refused to give their vote choice are not shown here. 
Source: EES 2014 
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Table 2:  Percentage vote for different types of parties as a percentage of previous party 
type vote share (2014) 
 
  Party type intending to vote for 
  Mainstream 
right 
Mainstream 
left 
Challenger 
right 
Challenger 
left 
Challenger 
green 
None 
%
 v
o
te
 s
h
ar
e 
Mainstream right 83% 6% 18% 8% 9% 12% 
Mainstream left 3% 78% 9% 14% 17% 9% 
Challenger right 1% - 50% 2% 2% 2% 
Challenger left - 1% 3% 56% 2% 2% 
Challenger green - - 1% 3% 54% - 
None 12% 13% 20% 18% 17% 74% 
All 
(N) 
100% 
4,110 
100% 
3,858 
100% 
1,385 
100% 
1,566 
100% 
569 
100% 
5,515 
 
Note:  Percentages less than 1% are not shown here. The ‘None’ category includes people who said they did not 
vote, or were not intending to vote, people that didn’t know how they voted, or how they were intending 
to vote, and people who refused to give a response to the question.   
Source: EES 2014 
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Table 3:  Multinomial logit model predicting defection from mainstream parties  
  Model 1 
Defection from government mainstream 
Model 2 
Defection from opposition mainstream 
  Opposition Challenger Non-voter Government Challenger Non-voter 
  B B B B B B 
Affected by crisis 0.30** 0.24** 0.15* -0.19 0.30** 0.10 
       
Political interest  -0.08 -0.07 -0.40** 0.13 0.00 -0.34** 
       
Constant -2.62** -0.93* -0.60 -18.4 -2.59** -2.03** 
Pseudo R-square 
N 
0.13 
5,814 
   0.15 
2,989 
 
 
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01. Reference category for model 1 is vote intention for mainstream governing party, 
reference category for model 2 is vote intention for mainstream opposition party. Only people who previously 
voted for a mainstream government party are included in model 1, and only people who voted for a mainstream 
opposition party are included in model 2. Other control variables included in both models, but not shown above, 
are fixed effects for country, and individual level control variables of age, occupational social class, religiosity, 
sex, education, citizenship and trade union membership. 
Source: EES 2014 
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Figure 2:  Changes in the predicted probability of defection/ loyalty for those who 
experience two economic impacts compared to those who experience none 
   
Note: These probabilities come from models 1 and 2 in table 3. They represent the difference between people 
who score 2 on the economic impact scale and those who score 0 on the scale in the probability of defection/ 
loyalty. The predicted probabilities are for a Dutch man with a white collar job, low education, not in a trade 
union with the mean age and mean political interest of someone who voted for a mainstream party in the last 
national election.  
Source: EES 2014 
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Table 4:  Multinomial logit model predicting defection from mainstream parties to 
challenger parties and non-voting  
  Challenger right Challenger left Challenger green Non-voter 
  B B B B 
Policy 
position  
(high scores 
= against) 
Immigration 0.16** -0.02 -0.08* 0.00 
EU 0.14** 0.04 -0.07* 0.03* 
Environment 0.01 -0.03 -0.24** -0.02 
Redistribution 0.02 -0.18** -0.09* -0.01 
Govt spending 0.07** -0.00 -0.06 0.02 
     
Affected by crisis 0.18* 0.19* 0.21 0.11* 
     
Political interest  -0.11 0.04 -0.13 -0.36** 
      
Constant -5.02** -2.74* -0.53 -1.47** 
N=8,680. Pseudo R-square = 0.15. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 
 
Note: Reference category is vote intention for mainstream party. Only people who previously voted for a 
mainstream party are included in the model. Policy position is measured on a 0-10 scale for each of the five 
policy areas. Other control variables included in the model, but not shown above, are fixed effects for country, 
and individual level control variables of age, occupational social class, religiosity, sex, education, citizenship 
and trade union membership. 
Source: EES 2014 
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Figure 3:  Changes in the predicted probability of defection/ loyalty when changing 
policy position on the three policy scales 
 
 
Note: These probabilities come from the model in table 4. They represent the difference between people who 
score one standard deviation below the mean on the policy scale compared to those who score one standard 
deviation above the mean on the policy scale. The predicted probabilities are for a Dutch man with a skilled 
manual job, low education, not in a trade union with the mean age, mean political interest and mean policy 
positions on the other four scales of someone who voted for a mainstream party in the last national election.  
Source: EES 2014 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1:  Multinomial logit model predicting mobilisation from non-voting to 
mainstream party and challenger party voting  
  Challenger right Challenger left Challenger green Mainstream 
  B B B B 
Policy 
position  
(high scores 
= against) 
Immigration 0.14** -0.03 -0.07* -0.03 
EU 0.07* 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 
Environment 0.00 -0.03 -0.14** 0.01 
Redistribution 0.04 -0.12** -0.11* 0.01 
Govt spending 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 
     
Affected by crisis 0.25** 0.11 -0.09 -0.05 
     
Political interest  0.42** 0.59** 0.67** 0.52** 
      
Constant -5.29** -2.18** -1.03 -2.45** 
N=4,054. Pseudo R-square = 0.15. * p<0.1 **p<0.05 
 
Note: Reference category is vote intention for no party. Only people who previously did not vote are included in 
the model. Other control variables are included in the model, but not shown above. These are fixed effects for 
country, and individual level control variables of age, occupational social class, religiosity, sex, education, 
citizenship and trade union membership. 
Source: EES 2014 
  
35 
 
Table A2:  Multinomial logit model predicting defection from mainstream parties to niche 
parties 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Defection from government 
mainstream 
Defection from opposition 
mainstream 
  Opposition Niche 
Non-
voter 
Government Niche 
Non-
voter 
 
B B B B B B 
Affected by crisis 0.28** 0.25** 0.15* -0.18 0.27** 0.13 
       
Political interest  -0.13 -0.07 -0.40** 0.13 0.03 -0.34** 
       
Constant -18.65 -0.53 -0.55 -2.44 20.61 18.79 
Pseudo R-square 0.13 
      
0.24 
  
N 5,638 2,982 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 
 
Note: This model replicates Table 3 in the main manuscript, but uses a different operationalization of 
mainstream and challenger parties. In table A2 we adopt the distinction between mainstream and niche parties 
put forward by Adams et al. (2006) where niche parties have either “an  extreme ideology (such as Communist 
and extreme nationalist parties) or noncentrist “niche” ideology (i.e., the Greens)”  (513). Following Adams and 
co-authors this has been operationalized using the Comparative Manifesto Project classification of parties into 
party families where parties belonging to the Green/Ecological [10], Communist/Socialist [20], and Nationalist 
[70] party families as well as special issue special issue parties [95] with non-centrist niche ideologies classified 
as niche parties (see Appendix A4). Reference category for model 1 is vote intention for mainstream governing 
party, reference category for model 2 is vote intention for mainstream opposition party. Only people who 
previously voted for a mainstream government party are included in model 1, and only people who voted for a 
mainstream opposition party are included in model 2. Other control variables are included in both models, but 
not shown above. These are fixed effects for country, and individual level control variables of age, occupational 
social class, religiosity, sex, education, citizenship and trade union membership. 
Source: EES 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36 
 
Table A3:  Multinomial logit model predicting defection from mainstream parties to niche 
parties and non-voting 
  
Niche party right Niche party left 
Niche party 
green 
Non-voter 
  B B B B 
Policy 
position  
(high scores 
= against) 
Immigration 0.20** -0.03 -0.15** 0.00 
EU 0.16** 0.04 -0.08* 0.03* 
Environment 0.01 -0.02 -0.26** -0.02 
Redistribution 0.002 -0.19** -0.06 -0.01 
Govt spending 0.05* -0.02 -0.04 0.02 
     
Affected by crisis 0.18* 0.20* 0.18 0.11* 
     
Political interest  -0.07 0.03 -0.14 -0.36** 
      
Constant -4.46 -2.55** -0.32 -1.20** 
N=4,054. Pseudo R-square = 0.15. * p<0.1 **p<0.05 
Note:  This model replicates Table 4 in the main manuscript, but focuses on niche parties rather than challenger 
parties, similarly to Table A2 (see Appendix A4 for list of niche parties). Reference category is vote intention 
for mainstream party. Only people who previously voted for a mainstream party are included in the model. 
Policy position is measured on a 0-10 scale for each of the five policy areas. Other control variables are included 
in the model, but not shown above. These are fixed effects for country, and individual level control variables of 
age, occupational social class, religiosity, sex, education, citizenship and trade union membership. 
Source: EES 2014 
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Table A4:   Categorization of Parties (Mainstream, Challenger and Niche Parties)  
 
 
Austria  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche 
parties 
Austrian People's 
Party 
Austrian Social 
Democratic Party 
Citizens' Forum 
Austria 
Pirate Party of 
Austria 
The Greens 
 
 
Austrian 
Freedom 
Party [R] 
Austrian Freedom 
Party 
 NEOS - The New 
Austria and 
Liberal Forum 
 
Austrian 
Communist 
Party 
 Alliance for 
the Future of 
Austria[R] 
 
Alliance for the 
Future of Austria 
 
 
 Liberal Forum   Austrian 
Communist 
Party [L] 
  The Change    The Greens 
[G] 
 
 
 
Belgium 
 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenge
r Party 
Green  
Niche 
parties 
Christian 
Democratic and 
Flemish Party 
Workers Party of 
Belgium 
New Flemish 
Alliance 
 Green! 
 
Flemish 
Interest [R] 
 
Open Flemish 
Liberals and 
Democrats 
Socialist Party 
Different 
Flemish Interest   Green! [G] 
 
Reform Movement 
 
Pirate Party ProDG   Ecologists 
[G] 
The Right Ecologists People's Party   Pirate Party 
[L] 
Francophone 
Democratic 
Federalists 
Workers Party of 
Belgium 
Party for Freedom 
and Progress 
  People's 
Party [R] 
 People’s Party    Workers 
Party of 
Belgium [L] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyprus 
Mainstream  Mainstream Left Challenger Party Challenger Challenger Niche parties 
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Right Right Party Left Party Green  
Democratic 
Coalition 
Social Democrats' 
Movement 
National Popular 
Front 
Citizens' 
Alliance 
Ecological and 
Environmental 
Movement 
(Cyprus Green 
Party) 
 
Ecological 
and 
Environmental 
Movement 
(Cyprus Green 
Party) [G] 
 
Democratic Party Progressive Party 
of the Working 
People 
European Party 
(Cyprus) 
  National 
Popular Front 
[R] 
     European 
Party (Cyprus) 
[R] 
 
 
 
Denmark  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party Green  
Niche parties 
Liberals Social Democratic 
Party 
Danish People's 
Party 
Red-Green 
Unity List 
 Red-Green 
Unity List [L] 
Radical Party Socialist People's 
Party 
Liberal Alliance   Socialist 
People's Party 
[L] 
Christian 
Democrats 
    Danish 
People's Party 
[R] 
Conservative 
People's Party 
     
      
 
 
Finland  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party Green  
Niche parties 
National Coalition Finnish Social 
Democrats 
Finns Party Pirate Party 
of Finland 
 Green Union 
[G] 
Christian 
Democrats in 
Finland 
Green Union Freedom Party - 
Finland's Future 
Communist 
Party of 
Finland 
 Left Wing 
Alliance [L] 
Finnish Centre Left Wing 
Alliance 
   Communist 
Workers' 
Party - For 
Peace and 
Socialism [L] 
Swedish People's 
Party 
Communist 
Workers' Party - 
For Peace and 
Socialism 
   Finns Party 
[R] 
 For the Poor    Freedom 
Party - 
Finland's 
Future [R] 
     Pirate Party of 
Finland [L] 
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     Communist 
Party of 
Finland [L] 
 
 
France 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche parties 
Union for a 
Popular Movement 
Socialist Party National Front New 
Anticapitalist 
Party 
 National 
Front [R] 
New Centre Europe Ecology - 
The Greens 
Miscellaneous 
Right 
Workers' 
Struggle 
 Left Front [L] 
Arise the Republic Left Radical Party  Alliance of 
Regionalists, 
Ecologists 
and 
Progressives 
of Overseas 
regions and 
Peoples' 
Solidarity 
 Alliance of 
Regionalists, 
Ecologists 
and 
Progressives 
of Overseas 
regions and 
Peoples' 
Solidarity [L] 
Democratic 
Movement 
Left Front  New Deal  Workers' 
Struggle [L] 
Centrist Alliance   Regionalists  New 
Anticapitalist 
Party [L] 
Union of 
Democrats and 
Independents – 
UDI + MoDem 
  Miscellaneous 
Left 
 Europe 
Ecology - The 
Greens [G] 
Radical Party      
 
 
 
Germany  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challeng
er Party 
Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche parties 
Christian 
Democratic Union 
Social Democratic 
Party 
Alternative for 
Germany 
Pirates Human 
Environment
al Animal 
Protection 
Alliance 90 / 
The Greens 
[G] 
Christian Social 
Union 
Alliance 90 / The 
Greens 
 The Left Ecological 
Democratic 
Party 
 
Free Democratic 
Party 
 The Republicans   National 
Democratic 
Party of 
Germany [R] 
  Party of Bible-
abiding Christians 
  The 
Republicans 
[R] 
  Family Party of 
Germany 
  Party of Bible-
abiding 
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Christians [R] 
     Pirates [L] 
     The Left [L] 
     Human 
Environmental 
Animal 
Protection [G] 
     Ecological 
Democratic 
Party [G] 
 
Greece  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenge
r Party 
Green  
Niche 
parties 
New Democracy Panhellenic 
Socialist 
Movement 
Independent 
Greeks 
Coalition 
of the 
Radical 
Left 
(SYRIZA) 
Ecologist 
Greens 
Popular 
Orthodox 
Rally [R] 
Popular Orthodox 
Rally 
 Golden Dawn Democratic 
Left 
 Golden 
Dawn [R] 
     Independent 
Greeks [R] 
  The River (Greece) Communist 
Party of 
Greece 
 Coalition of 
the Radical 
Left 
(SYRIZA) 
[L] 
   Recreate 
Greece! 
 Democratic 
Left [L] 
     Communist 
Party of 
Greece [L] 
     Ecologist 
Greens [G] 
 
Ireland  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger Party 
Left 
Challenge
r Party 
Green  
Niche 
parties 
Family of the Irish  
(Fine Gael) 
Labour Party Christian 
Solidarity 
(CS) 
Ourselves Alone  
(Sinn Fein) 
New 
Vision (Fis 
Nua) 
Green Party 
[G] 
Soldiers of Destiny  
(Fianna Fail) 
Green Party  Socialist Party  Ourselves 
Alone  
(Sinn Fein) 
[L] 
   People Before 
Profit Alliance 
(PBP) 
 Socialist 
Party [L] 
   South Kerry 
Independent 
Alliance (SKIA) 
 Socialist 
Party [L] 
   Worker's Party 
(WP) 
 Worker's 
Party (WP) 
[L] 
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   United Left 
Alliance 
 New Vision 
(Fis Nua) 
[G] 
   Non 
Party/People's 
Convention (PC) 
  
 
 
Italy 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream 
Left 
Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party Green  
Niche 
parties 
People of Freedom Democratic 
Party 
South Tyrol 
People's 
Party 
Left Ecology 
Movement 
 Northern 
League [R] 
Northern League Civil Revolution Civic Choice Five Star 
Movement 
 Left Ecology 
Movement 
[L] 
Brothers of Italy - 
National Centre-
right 
List di Pietro 
Italy of Values 
   Five Star 
Movement 
[L] 
Great South-
Movement for the 
Autonomies 
    Civil 
Revolution 
[L] 
Union for 
Christian and 
Center Democrats 
     
Go Italy      
New Centre-Right      
Populars for Italy      
 
 
Luxembourg  
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche 
parties 
Democratic Party Christian Social 
People's Party 
Alternative 
Democratic 
Reform Party 
Pirate Party of 
Luxembourg 
The Greens Alternative 
Democratic 
Reform 
Party [R] 
 Socialist Workers' 
Party 
Party for Full 
Democracy 
The Left  Pirate Party 
of 
Luxembourg 
[L] 
   Communist 
Party 
 The Left [L] 
     Communist 
Party [L] 
     The Greens 
[G] 
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Malta 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party Green  
Niche parties 
Nationalist Party Labour Party   Democratic 
Alternative 
Democratic 
Alternative 
[G] 
      
      
      
 
 
 
The Netherlands  
 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger Party 
Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche parties 
People's Party for 
Freedom and 
Democracy 
Labour Party Party of Freedom Socialist 
Party 
Green Left Party of Freedom 
[R] 
Christian 
Democratic 
Appeal 
Democrats '66 Reformed Political 
Party 
Pirate Party 
of the 
Netherlands 
 Reformed 
Political Party 
[R] 
Christian Union  50Plus   Coalition CU – 
SGP [R] 
Party for the 
Animals 
 Coalition CU - 
SGP 
  Socialist Party 
[L] 
     Pirate Party of 
the Netherlands 
[L] 
     Green Left [G] 
 
 
Portugal 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger Party 
Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche parties 
Social Democratic 
Party 
Socialist Party Popular 
Monarchist 
Party 
Unified 
Democratic 
Coalition 
Party for 
Animals 
and Nature 
Popular 
Monarchist 
Party [R] 
Social Democratic 
Center-Popular 
Party 
  Left Bloc  Unified 
Democratic 
Coalition [L] 
Earth Party   Portuguese 
Workers' 
Communist 
Party/Reorganized 
Movement of the 
Party of the 
Proletariat 
 Left Bloc [L] 
Coalition (Partido 
Social Democrata 
+ Centro 
Democrático 
Social/Partido 
  Challenger Left 
Party 
 Portuguese 
Workers' 
Communist 
Party [L] 
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Popular) (Coal. 
(PSD + CDS-PP)) 
   Ecologist Party 
'The Greens' 
 Ecologist Party 
'The Greens' 
[G] 
   Portuguese 
Communist Party 
(PCP) 
 Portuguese 
Communist 
Party (PCP) 
[L] 
     Party for 
Animals and 
Nature [G] 
 
 
Spain 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche parties 
Popular Party Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party 
Convergence 
and Union 
United Left Initiative for 
Catalonia 
Greens 
United Left 
[L] 
  Union, 
Progress and 
Democracy 
Amaiur Equo Equo [G] 
  Basque 
Nationalist 
Party 
Catalan 
Republican Left 
 Podemos (We 
Can) [L] 
  Galician 
Nationalist 
Bloc 
Commitment / 
Compromise for 
Galicia 
  
  Canarian 
Coalition 
Galician Left 
Alternative 
  
  Forum 
Asturias 
Citizens - Party 
of the Citizenry 
  
  Future Yes Podemos (We 
Can) 
  
  Citizens - 
Party of the 
Citizenry 
Commitment 
Coalition 
  
  Voice Anova-
Nationalist 
Brotherhood 
  
  Democratic 
Convergence 
of Catalonia 
New Left 
Catalan 
  
  Democratic 
Union of 
Catalonia 
Basque Country 
Unite 
  
 
 
Sweden 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party 
Green  
Niche 
parties 
Moderate 
Coalition Party 
Social Democratic 
Labour Party 
Sweden 
Democrats 
Left Party Green 
Ecology 
Sweden 
Democrats 
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Party [R] 
Liberal People's 
Party 
  Feminist 
Initiative 
 Left Party 
[L] 
Centre Party   Pirate Party  Feminist 
Initiative [L] 
Christian 
Democrats 
    Pirate Party 
[L] 
     Green 
Ecology 
Party [G] 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Mainstream  
Right 
Mainstream Left Challenger 
Party Right 
Challenger 
Party Left 
Challenger 
Party Green  
Niche parties 
Conservative Party Labour Party United 
Kingdom 
Independence 
Party 
Scottish 
National Party 
Green Party United 
Kingdom 
Independence 
Party [R] 
 Liberal Democrats British 
National Party 
Party of Wales 
(Plaid Cymru) 
 British 
National Party 
[R] 
  Christian 
Party 
Socialist 
Labour Party 
 English 
Democrats [R] 
  English 
Democrats 
  Socialist 
Labour Party 
[L] 
     Green Party 
[G] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
